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| Название книги: | How We Create Desire-independent Reasons for Action 6 |
| Автор: | John R. Searle, |
| Год издания: | 1967 |
| Страницы: | 79 |
| The single most remarkable capacity of human rational - ity , and the single way in which it differs most from ape rationality , is the capacity to create and to act on desire- independent reasons for action. The creation of such rea- sons is always a matter of an agent committing himself in various ways. The Classical Model cannot account either for the existence or for the rational binding force of such reasons, and indeed, most of the authors in the tradition of the Classical Model deny that any such things exist. We have seen that long-term prudence is already a difficulty for the Classical Model , because on that model an agent can only act rationally on a desire that she has then and there. We saw in the case of the cigarette smoker in Den- mark that it can be a requirement of rationality that an agent who lacks a desire then and there to act on her long- term prudential considerations nonetheless has a reason to do so. The Classical Model cannot account for this fact. On the Classical Model , the soldier who throws himself on a live hand-grenade in order to save the lives of his fellow soldiers is in exactly the same situation , rationally speaking, as the child who selects chocolate over vanilla when picking a flavor of ice cream. The soldier prefers death, the child prefers chocolate. In each case, rationality is just a matter of increasing the probability |