Китоб пас аз сабти ном дастрас аст.
| Номи китоб: | A DEFENSE OF THE USE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHY1 |
| Муаллиф: | |
| Соли нашр: | 0 |
| Теъдоди саҳифаҳо: | Не известно |
| Although some forms of reasoning are innate, others are culturally derived. That being so, there may be significant cultural variation in how we reason.2 If patterns of reasoning vary from culture to culture, accordingly, why should we prefer our own? One might naturally wonder: What makes one set of such patterns of reasoning, one “system” of reasoning “… better than another, and how are we to tell which system of reasoning is best?” (572) In a series of publications, Stephen Stich has taken up this question and has argued vigorously against “analytic epistemology.” He denies in particular that a subject’s system of reasoning is right in virtue of standing in reflective equilibrium |