Китоб пас аз сабти ном дастрас аст.
| Номи китоб: | Weakness of Will 7 |
| Муаллиф: | John R. Searle, |
| Соли нашр: | 1995 |
| Теъдоди саҳифаҳо: | 76 |
| Sometimes, indeed all too frequently , it happens that one goes through a process of deliberation , makes a con- sidered decision , thereby forms a firm and unconditional intention to do something , and when the moment arrives , because of weakness of will , does not do it . Now , if the relation between deliberation and intention is both causal and rational or logical, that is, if the rational processes cause intentions , and if intentions in turn cause actions by intentional causation , then how could there ever be genu - ine cases of weakness of will ? How could there be cases where an agent forms an all -out inclusive , unconditional intention to do something, nothing prevents him from doing it, and yet he still does not do it ? Amazingly , many philosophers think that such a thing is impossible and have advanced ingenious arguments to show that it is impossible, and that the apparent cases of weakness of will are really cases of something else. Alas, it is not only possible but quite common. Here for example is an all-too- common sort of case : a student forms a firm and uncon - ditional intention to work on his term paper Tuesday evening. Nothing prevents him from working on it, but when midnight comes, it turns out that he has spent the evening watching television and drinking beer |